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Introduction 
NATO's war over Kosovo has taken quite a 
beating: Even Joseph Nye- formerly Assistant 
Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administra-
tion- appears able to justify the campaign solely 
by reference to the need for NATO cohesion and 
credibility.' Michael Mandelbaum, meanwhile, 
dubs NATO's campaign "a perfect failure",' 
while Edward Luttwak admonishes us all to 
"'give war a chance".3 
The approach shared by most of NATO's 
critics is to describe NATO's policies, detect 
their faults..: defined as anything negative which 
happened after or while those policies were 
implemented - and then proceed to condemn 
them. Less time has been spent pondering 
possible alternatives. 
Focusing on the deficiencies of policies to 
the exclusion of the practical dilemmas from 
which they originated, is a common pastime of 
academics writing on current affairs. Surely, 
however, a realistic policy evaluation should take 
as its point of departure the concrete situation 
faced by decision makers, and on that basis 
evaluate the wisdom of the policies chosen and 
the viability of potential alternative remedies. 
Such an approach would reflect the rather 
obvious insight that even if a given course of 
action had unpleasant and/or unforeseen conse-
quences, those may have been preferable to the 
consequences of any other available alternative. 
What, then, were the essential characteristics 
of the situation NATO was facing in Kosovo? 
Four aspects of the conflict seem to stand out: 
first, the parties to the conflict had incompatible 
strategic goals, and were willing to apply (dis-
proportionate) force to achieve them; secondly, 
the conflict occurred in the immediate vicinity 
of NATO territory, in an area where NATO was 
already deeply involved; thirdly, the United 
Nations Security Council was- as a conse-
quence of the Russo-Chinese unwillingness to 
contemplate the use of force - precluded from 
managing the crisis; and, lastly, since the main 
goal of military action was to avoid a humanitar-
ian catastrophe, force - if it was to serve its 
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purpose- would have to be applied preventively. 
Taking these aspects of the situation into 
account, the argument in the following is that no 
viable alternative to NATO's general course of 
action was available. That is not to say that 
modifications to that policy could not have 
improved the final outcome. 
The ultimate goals of the Serb authorities and 
the local Albanian population regarding the final 
status of Kosovo were clearly incompatible. As 
to President Milosevic, his entire political career 
has been built on two main factors- manipula-
tive utilization of Serb nationalism and indis-
criminate organized violence- both lay at the 
heart of the conflict over Kosovo: The area is 
sacred to the Serbs for historical and religious 
reasons, and is legally part of Serbia. It was 
thus highly probable that the Milosevic regime, 
in the absence of direct international pressure, 
would respond to any sign of unrest in Kosovo 
with extended and indiscriminate use of force. It 
was equally clear that the regime would reject 
any political solution that did not de facto allow 
for continued unchecked Serb dominance in 
Kosovo, including the access to employ un-
checked force as a response to secessionist 
activity. 
Among the Kosovar Albanians, meanwhile, 
there had occurred a gradual loss of faith in the 
ability of the non-violent approach of President 
Rugova to gain any degree of autonomy for the 
province. The growing strength and assertive-
ness of the KLA meant that Milosevic- never 
one for peaceful contlict resolution- suddenly 
had attained the perfect pretext for reasserting 
Serb control in Kosovo by violent means. This 
obviously served to reinforce Albanian opinion in 
favor of independence. 
Thus, the international community was faced 
with a conflict driven by local actors in the 
absence of forceful international intervention, 
and unavoidably exploding into an inferno of 
human suffering. By late September 1999-
winter approaching- according to UNHCR 
there were more than 250 000 refugees in 
Kosovo, 50 000 of whom had fled to the moun-
tains and thus had no access to shelter, food or 
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medicines. Without NATO's intervention, that 
forced Milosevic to accept an international 
presence in Kosovo, thousands - possibly tens 
of thousands - of those people would surely 
have perished. 
The prospect of yet another humanitarian 
disaster in the Balkans was bad enough in itself. 
The acuteness of the situation was enhanced, 
however, by the realization that the credibility 
and effectiveness ofNA TO's effort in Bosnia, 
and the international community's efforts in the 
Balkans in general, would have been completely 
ruined had the world stood by and watched -
live on CNN·- a humanitarian disaster in 
Kosovo, instigated by the same people who 
were largely responsible for the massacres in 
Bosnia. Humanitarian concerns, the general 
stability of the Balkans, and- as a result of 
these-NATO's credibility, thus hinged on 
avoiding the worst in Kosovo. Not acting was 
not a serious option - the question was when, 
how, and under which authority. 
The legal basis 
If the UN Charter is to be understood literally, it 
seems clear that, short of (collective) self-
defense under article 51, military force in 
international politics- to be lawful- must be 
mandated by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil, alternatively by the General Assembly under 
a "Uniting for Peace"-type resolution of the kind 
that was passed early in the Korean war. Neither 
of the two constituted the basis for NATO's 
actions over Kosovo. The question, then, must 
be whether there exists, in accordance with the 
spirit if not the Jetter of international Jaw, room 
for the use of military force of the kind NATO 
employed against Yugoslavia. At the heart of this 
question lies the possibility of the great power 
veto being exercised in the United Nations 
Security Council. 
The paralysis of the Security Council during 
the Kosovo crisis constitutes an excellent 
example of how the veto powers- acting purely 
in their own national interest and with supreme 
disregard for the international rules and norms 
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the Council is supposed to uphold- can use 
their institutionalized privileges to sideline the 
UN.' This illustrates that a literal adherence to 
the UN charter on this subject may have rather 
gruesome consequences: A Holocaust-like 
situation- given that it is confined within the 
borders of one state, and that one veto-power is 
ready to condone it- may occur unhindered by 
the international community. The problem is 
structural rather than situational - the conflict 
between human rights and the principle of non-
intervention is in such cases per definition 
unbridgeable - and few experts would therefore 
be willing to adhere to such a narrow interpreta-
tion of the UN Charter. 
Given the structural deficiencies of the UN, it 
seems necessary to leave an opening- under 
exceptional circumstances- for military action 
even in the absence of a Security Council 
mandate. The criteria for when such action 
would be acceptable, however, need to be quite 
specific in order to minimize excess. One 
possible approach is to accept that acute hu-
manitarian concerns can - if the Security 
Council is deadlocked- in themselves be suffi-
cient reason for international intervention in a 
conflict area. Four conditions should be fulfilled 
in such cases: a humanitarian catastrophe must 
be imminent; the government of the country in 
which that disaster is occurring must have 
demonstrated that it lacks either the will or the 
means to handle the situation; all other possible 
remedies must have been considered; and the 
intervention should be restricted to what is 
necessary to prevent disaster from erupting-' 
It is this author's view that NATO's air war 
against Yugoslavia met these criteria. That, 
however, does not make NATO's campaign 
unproblematic. Most governments, including a 
majority ofNA TO ones, would probably reject 
the above suggestions out of hand: The Norwe-
gian government, for example, preferred a 
rather spurious formal justification ofNA TO's 
actions- based mainly on UNSC resolution 1199 
and General Secretary Koffi Annan's statements 
- rather than to accept humanitarian rationales 
as sufficient. 
IFS Info 1/00 
The main objection to the idea of humanitar-
ian concerns being a sufficient basis for armed 
intervention, relates to precedence effects -the 
fear being that accepting situational rather than 
institutional legitimization will lead to widespread 
abuse. This view cannot be disregarded. Yet it 
seems to confuse publicly stated rationales with 
the underlying real ones. 
What the skeptics fear is presumably the 
abuse of such a precedent, not the actual 
precedent. It is not humanitarian intervention as 
such that is feared, but interventions for selfish 
gain masquerading as humanitarian. Moreover, it 
is hard to im'agine any state going to war be-
cause a precedent exists for humanitarian 
intervention. More substantial rationales will 
usually be present when a country's leaders 
choose such an extreme option. Moreover, a 
reference to the '"Kosovo precedent" in cases 
where the real motives are selfish ones, will 
constitute a rather shallow excuse, easily seen 
through by the international community. A 
precedent for humanitarian intervention, then, 
will most likely neither lead to, nor constitute a 
credible excuse for, interventions that are not in 
fact humanitarian in their essence. 
Those worrying about precedent should also 
consider the precedent of inaction - that the 
disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force 
against civilians meets no forceful international 
response in cases where the Security Council is 
divided. 
A strong case can thus be made for NATO's 
intervention beingjustified on humanitarian 
grounds alone. It should also be noted that the 
Secretary General of the UN has come as close 
as he possibly can to condoning NATO's ac-
tions. At the centennial of the first International 
Peace Conference in The Hague Koffi Annan 
stated that- though the Security Council holds 
primary responsibility for maintaining interna-
tional peace and security- "it was the rejection 
of a political settlement by the Yugoslav authori-
ties which made this action necessary", and 
there "are times when the use of force may be 
legitimate in the pursuit of peace."' In other 
words, as seen by the General Secretary of the 
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United Nations, NATO did what the Security 
Council -had it done its duty- should have 
mandated NATO to do. 
It should also be remembered that the deci-
sion to intervene was made unanimously by the 
NATO Council, which counts among its mem-
bers some of the most democratic and human 
rights-conscious countries in the world. (This 
seems a hard point for the opponents of inter-
vention to grasp - most seem to consider the 
NATO action to have been a US affair. In 
military terms that may have been a justifiable 
view; in political terms, it most certainly was 
not. Consensus in NATO may well constitute as 
good an insurance against the abuse of power as 
the unlikely consensus among the veto powers 
of the Security Council, should a Kosovo-like 
situation reoccur. 
Timing 
Military intervention in Kosovo would have to be 
preventive. The prevailing consensus was that 
another Srebrenica should not to be allowed to 
happen. At the same time, a negotiated solution 
was clearly preferable. This dilemma was the 
main reason for NATO's apparent dithering in 
the year leading up to the bombing. 
In early October I 99&, however, at least 
50,000 people, having been forced by the 
Milosevic-regime's indiscriminate and dispro-
portionate use of violence to flee into the moun-
tains, stood in immediate danger of freezing/ 
starving to death. To prevent this scenario from 
unfolding, the NATO Council issued its Activa-
tion Order for the bombing of Yugoslavia. This 
provided US negotiator Richard Hoi brooke with 
increased leverage, ultimately leading to the 
Holbrooke-Milosevic deal on the OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission. This agreement allowed in 
2000 unarmed observers and, equally important, 
permitted free access for humanitarian NGOs. 
The agreement gave both the refugees, NATO, 
and the Milosevic regime much needed breathing 
space. 
It soon became obvious that Milosevic 
neither intended to make the political conces-
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sions that would be required for an acceptable 
status quo, nor to cease the disproportionate use 
of force against the Kosovar Albanians. The 
Milosevic regime at no time showed any sign of 
accepting NATO's basic demands- some kind 
of autonomy for the Kosovars, a withdrawal of 
the Serb army from Kosovo, unimpeded interna-
tional access to the province, and verifiable and 
enforceable guarantees against the resumption 
of ethnic cleansing. At the same time, violence 
against the Kosovar Albanians gradually re-
sumed, and the deterrent effect of NATO's 
bomb threats was lessened by the day as no 
action was taken. Given the history of the 
Milosevic regime, its diplomatic intransigence, 
and its appalling actions in the field, there was 
no reason to give it the benefit of the doubt. 
Ends and means 
It has been frequently argued that the NATO 
bombing campaign was the direct cause of the 
Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo 
which was instigated a few days before the 
bombing started. That is possible, though less 
obvious than it has been made out to be. Even if 
correct, however, this hardly constitutes a 
decisive argument against the bombing. It is the 
nature of war that things will almost per defini-
tion get worse before they get better. Thus, 
when making the decision to bomb, the judg-
ment of the NATO Council implied that any 
undesirable risks relating to that course of 
action were worth taking, because the alterna-
tive - unimpeded Serb control over Kosovo, and 
the abuses of power coming with it- was 
unacceptable in the long run. It should be noted 
that this judgment was widely supported by 
those who suffered most from the ethnic 
cleansing, the Kosovar Albanians themselves. 
There are few instances in the history of war-
fare when it has been clear from the outset that 
the use of military force would minimize human 
suffering. The costs of combat will always 
seem uncertain, even prohibitively high, in the 
short run. In June I 94 I, for example, it must 
have seemed far from clear that the UK/French 
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decision to declare war on Germany over Poland 
two years earlier had been a wise one, judged 
either by the standards of humanitarianism or 
realpolitik. 
An evaluation of the results ofNA TO's 
actions should take the alliance's stated goals as 
a starting point. These goals were, somewhat 
simplified, to get the Serb forces out, the 
Kosovar Albanian refugees home, and aNA TO 
peacekeeping force' and humanitarian NGOs in. 
All of these were achieved. The number of 
casualties resulting from the campaign is yet 
uncertain, but they were probably lower than 
they would have been by now had NATO not 
intervened. As to long term consequences, 
several scenarios could still unfold. Still, the 
uncertainty regarding developments in the region 
would most certainly have been even greater-
and the running costs significantly higher- had 
the Milosevic-regime been given a free rein in 
Kosovo. 
The basic point is that NATO had run out of 
options: the position of the Milosevic regime 
was secure - removing it was a long term goal 
unsuitable as a solution to an immediate prob-
lem; the same regime showed no sign of grant-
ing concessions that would rule out future 
atrocities; the international presence in Kosovo 
had no enforcement capacity, and was becom-
ing less respected by the day; finally, NATO's 
threats to bomb were losing credibility for every 
day without action. The last point has tended to 
be overlooked in the debates, but is clearly 
important: It was not possible to preserve the 
status quo ante over Kosovo, since the credibil-
ity of NATO's threats, on which the uneasy 
balance rested, could not be sustained forever if 
action was not taken. 
NATO, then, was right to use force at the 
time it did. That, however, does not absolve the 
alliance of responsibility for the manner in 
which it acted. On that count the critics have a 
strong case. Preparations for the flood of 
refugees in the early days of the bombing were 
insufficient- though NATO troops in Macedonia 
and Albania rapidly adapted to the new situation. 
The limitations on the air war made the cam-
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paign less effective- particularly against the 
Yugoslav forces who were conducting the 
ethnic cleansing- than it could have been. 
A more serious fault in NATO's policies, 
however, concerns the explicit ruling out of 
ground troops. This decision both deprived the 
Alliance of its most valuable deterrent asset and 
gave the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo the opportu-
nity to disperse and conceal, and thus lessen the 
effect of the air war. An early and credible 
threat of using ground troops could conceivably 
have avoided the war altogether, as President 
Milosevic may have concluded that such a 
conflict posed too great a challenge to his own 
power. That he finally yielded only when con-
vinced that NATO was ready to move in on the 
ground, supports this conclusion. This was the 
cardinal weakness ofNA TO's Kosovo policies, 
for which all alliance governments must share 
responsibility. 
The reasons for this position, however, are 
not hard to find. The need for alliance cohesion 
made it necessary both to minimize own losses 
and also limit the gravity of the military cam-
paign. This need for cohesion, moreover, was 
magnified by domestic political opposition to the 
war in many NATO countries. Thus, the limited 
air war became the lowest common denomina-
tor. This should not set a precedent for future 
action, on the part ofNA TO or any other alli-
ance. Less efficient crisis management and less 
decisive use of force may, however, be an 
unavoidable price to be paid for the increased 
legitimacy of multilateral action- one actor will 
almost per definition be more decisive than 
sixteen, or nineteen. This should induce caution 
as to the circumstances under which multilateral 
action should be taken. 
Still, over Kosovo NATO had no choice but 
to act, and, as former Secretary General Javier 
Solana has pointed out,' the Alliance achieved all 
its stated goals in Kosovo. Moreover, the overall 
effects of the campaign have almost certainly 
been positive, granted the situation that local 
actors had created on the ground. 
Preventive military action- especially when 
it is conducted mainly for humanitarian pur-
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poses rather than purposes of traditional national 
interest- will always be vulnerable to Monday 
morning quarterbacks claiming that develop-
ments without intervention would have been 
preferable: That is unavoidable when action is 
taken before disaster strikes. NATO, however, 
chose to choose sides, and - as the newly 
released UN report on the Srebrenica massacre 
concludes- impartiality is neither an honorable 
nor a workable option when faced with ethnic 
cleansing. The lesson from Kosovo should not 
be that NATO should not act to avert humanitar-
ian catastrophes in the future, but that it should 
act with greater determination, and be better 
prepared to secure peace for all when peace 
arrives. 
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